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INTRODUCTION 
The director of a small charity faces a tough predicament. He needs 
money for growing medical expenses. He knows he can quietly dip into 
his charity’s funds to meet these mounting obligations. However, the 
question he is most concerned about is: Will anyone notice if funds are 
missing?  
Traditionally, the state attorney general’s office has been responsible 
for overseeing a state’s charitable sector and ensuring directors’ 
compliance with fiduciary standards.1 Scholars have long criticized the 
current charitable oversight system.2 Louisiana is no exception. In 
Louisiana, no decisions have been reported of the attorney general 
bringing suit against a charitable director for violating good governance 
standards. In fact, even when parties other than the attorney general 
challenge a charitable organization’s operations, courts have passed on the 
opportunity to decide cases using laws relating to nonprofit organizations, 
choosing instead to decide the cases using contract law.3  
Despite many calls for change in the enforcement model for charitable 
oversight,4 states have left the authority to police charities with the 
respective state attorney general’s office.5 Many commentators believe 
that state attorney general offices are understaffed and underfinanced, and 
this lack of resources prevents them from holding directors accountable 
for violating their fiduciary responsibilities.6 Given the challenges facing 
the current system of enforcement, these same scholars have suggested a 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by MAXWELL B. KALLENBERGER. 
 1. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit 
Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 403 (2012). 
 2. See infra Part III. 
 3. See, e.g., New Orleans Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. S. Reg’l Opera Endowment 
Fund, 993 So. 2d 791, 799 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (deciding the case on contract law 
rather than nonprofit law when a charitable trust was accused of misappropriating 
assets). 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5142(a)(5), 5250, 6511 (West 2014); N.Y. 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 112 (Mckinney 2014); REVISED MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.70, 3.04(b)–(c), 8.10 (a), 14.03–.04 (3d ed. 2008). 
 6. James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 
218, 262–63 (2003). 
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variety of new models that are a better fit to enforce charitable fiduciary 
standards.7 
This Comment proposes a self-funded state regulatory organization that 
is responsible for charitable oversight and regulation within Louisiana, 
replacing the current regulatory system under the attorney general’s office. 
No perfect model or answer exists to the problem of properly regulating the 
charitable sector; however, this self-funded organization would help ensure 
proper regulation of Louisiana’s charitable sector and place authority in a 
dedicated enforcement body, whose only task would consist of overseeing 
charities.  
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of charitable organizations 
and director fiduciary standards. Part II explains the current model of 
enforcement and the problems with the system. Part III discusses various 
scholarly proposals for new models of enforcement. And finally, Part IV 
explains why a self-funded regulatory organization best ensures proper 
oversight of charities and their directors. 
I. THE CHARITABLE LANDSCAPE OF LOUISIANA 
The provisions governing charitable organizations operating in Louisiana 
are placed in Titles 12 and 51 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.8 State law 
governs the organization and regulation of charities, and many states enact 
such laws to regulate charitable organizations.9 Similar to statutes governing 
for-profit corporations,10 these regulations are necessary for charitable 
organizations seeking to operate legally in Louisiana.11 
A. The Charitable Distinction 
An important distinction exists between a nonprofit organization and 
a charity. The term “nonprofit” is a state law organizational concept, 
making an organization eligible for certain state law tax benefits.12 If an 
                                                                                                             
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:201 to :275 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 51 
(2003, 2012, & Supp. 2015).  
 9. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 222; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. 
LAW § 35; CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5001–10845. 
 10. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1-101 to 1-1704 (containing Louisiana’s 
Business Corporation statutes) (Supp. 2015). 
 11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN § 12:203 (setting forth the requirements to form 
a nonprofit corporation in Louisiana). 
 12. Applying for Exemption – Difference Between Nonprofit and Tax-Exempt 
Status, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Applying-for-Exemption-
Difference-Between-Nonprofit-and-Tax-Exempt-Status [http://perma.cc/CBY3-SU 
SM] (last updated Mar. 4, 2015). 
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organization forms as a nonprofit at the state level, it will not automatically 
receive federal tax exemption status.13 The Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”) is responsible for granting tax-exemption status through a set of 
requirements that an applying organization must meet.14  
Whereas a nonprofit is a state law status, the classification of “charity” 
is based on the IRS’s determination that a nonprofit meets specific 
requirements for tax-exemption.15 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code states that an organization formed and operated for a 
charitable purpose will automatically receive tax-exemption from the 
IRS.16 Additionally, the organization cannot benefit private interests, and 
net earnings of the organization cannot benefit private individuals.17 
B. How is a Charity Formed? 
Generally, a charity will form under its state’s nonprofit corporation 
act, making it a specific type of nonprofit.18 Charities may also form as 
charitable trusts.19 Charitable organizations formed as neither trusts nor 
corporations are rare, and the law that applies to those types of 
organizations is vague and ambiguous, blurring the line of whether they 
truly fall under the definition of a charity.20 In a similar fashion, the law 
that applies to charitable organizations is also poorly defined and has 
developed slowly in comparison to for-profit corporation law.21 
                                                                                                             
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Types of Tax-Exempt Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Charities-
&-Non-Profits/Types-of-Tax-Exempt-Organizations [http://perma.cc/7M76-QV4A] 
(last updated Jan. 15, 2015). 
 16. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). A complete overview and analysis of the tax-
exempt determination process is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an 
overview of this process, see Karen Donnelly, Comment, Good Governance: Has 
the IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the 
Name of Transparency and Accountability?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 163, 169–72 
(2010).  
 17. Exemption Requirements – 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS, http://www.irs.gov 
/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable-Organizations/Exemption-Requirements-Section 
-501(c)(3)-Organizations [http://perma.cc/TU9A-738D] (last updated Jan. 8, 2015). 
This Comment will refer exclusively to charitable organizations.  
 18. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. 
PA. L. REV. 497, 501–02 (1981); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:201 to 
12:275 (2010) (containing the Louisiana Nonprofit Corporation Act). 
 19. Fishman, supra note 6, at 224; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2271 
(2009) (detailing trusts formed for charitable purposes). 
 20. See Hansmann, supra note 18, at 502. This Comment will focus on 
charitable organizations formed as either charitable trusts or corporations. 
 21. Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, 
Law, and Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1377 (2003); 
see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
2015] COMMENT 665 
 
 
 
C. Distinguishing For-Profits from Charities  
Unlike for-profit corporations, where shareholders expect to share in 
profits earned by the corporation, owners of charitable organizations are 
prohibited from sharing simultaneously in both profits and control.22 In 
Louisiana, the law prohibits an organization formed under the Nonprofit 
Corporation Law Act from distributing dividends or pecuniary remunerations 
to shareholders and also restrains members from retaining the organization’s 
earnings.23 Louisiana’s regulations also define a charity as “a [juridical] 
person who is or holds himself out to be a benevolent, civic, recreational, 
educational, voluntary, health, law enforcement, social service, philanthropic, 
fraternal, humane, patriotic, religious, or eleemosynary organization.”24 
Charitable organizations are public-benefitting organizations in nature.25 
The charitable sector depends on the public’s trust that charities will serve a 
public purpose.26 The charitable sector’s commitment to serve the public’s 
needs distinguishes these types of organizations from for-profit 
organizations.27  
                                                                                                             
19 (2004) (stating that charitable law consists of trust law, corporate codes, federal 
and state tax laws, decedents’ estates, and selections from property). Louisiana 
recently revised its business corporation statutes in 2014 to be effective January 
1, 2015. See Glenn G. Morris, Model Business Corporation Act as Adopted in 
Louisiana, 75 LA. L. REV. 983, 983 (2015). The new model is based on the 
nationally-recognized Model Business Corporation Act. Id. A revision to the 
Nonprofit Corporation Act may also be forthcoming. However, the legislature has 
not passed any such revision at this time. 
 22. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 501.  
 23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:210(F) (2010); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12:266(1) (2010) (stating that the Nonprofit Corporation Law Act does not 
apply to “[a]ny corporation organized for any purpose involving pecuniary profit 
or gain to its shareholders or members, or which pays dividends or similar 
pecuniary remuneration.”). 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1901(1) (2010). An eleemosynary organization 
is one created for a dedicated charitable purpose or an organization which is 
supported by a charity. JAMES S. HOLLIDAY, JR., RICK J. NORMAN & DALE R. 
BARINGER, LOUISIANA CORPORATIONS, § 18:3, in 1 LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES 
1222 (2014). 
 25. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the 
Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
479, 489 (2010). Louisiana defines charity under the Deceptive Practices in 
Soliciting Charitable Organizations chapter to set guidelines for these organizations 
in soliciting donors. Id.  
 26. See id. 
 27. See Joel L. Fleishman, Public Trust in Not-for-Profit Organizations and 
the Need for Regulatory Reform, in PHILANTHROPY AND THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 
IN A CHANGING AMERICA 172, 173 (Charles T. Clotfelter & Thomas Ehrlich eds., 
1999). 
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D. Roles of Charitable Officers and Directors 
Typically, charities have a self-perpetuating board of directors who 
control the organization.28 Charity directors, like for-profit directors, appoint 
officers and executives responsible for running the organization on a day-
to-day basis.29 The directors of these boards are regarded as fiduciaries.30 
The Louisiana Revised Statutes state that officers and directors are 
fiduciaries and must act “in good faith, and with that diligence, care, 
judgment and skill which ordinary prudent men would exercise under 
similar circumstances in like positions.”31 
E. Fiduciary Obligations of Charity Directors 
Fiduciary duties are standards of conduct that directors must follow 
while serving their organization.32 Specifically, fiduciary duties require 
directors to act in a way that furthers the charitable organization’s purpose 
and prohibits the directors from making self-benefitting decisions.33 
Because charitable organizations serve a public purpose, their directors are 
held to a higher standard of fiduciary obligations than their for-profit 
counterparts.34 For example, a director acts out his or her fiduciary 
obligations by making informed and reasonable decisions that are in the best 
interest of the charitable organization.35 If, however, directors continually 
miss meetings, make uninformed decisions, or use their positions for 
personal benefit, they have likely breached their fiduciary responsibilities.36 
                                                                                                             
 28. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 19. A self-perpetuating board of directors 
is a system where the out-going directors vote for their own replacements. See Ellis 
Carter, Nonprofit Law Jargon Buster – Voting Members vs. Self-Perpetuating Boards, 
CHARITY LAW. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://charitylawyerblog.com/2011/04/26/nonprofit-
law-jargon-buster-voting-members-vs-self-perpetuating-boards/ [http://perma.cc/N2H 
4-W4VB]. 
 29. See Brent Wilson, Advising and Serving on Non-Profit Boards: No Good 
Deed Goes Unpunished, 53 ADVOCATE, no. 9, Sept. 2010, at 39. 
 30. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 349; see infra Part I.D; see also LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:201(11) (2010) (stating that fiduciary means “any person, 
firm, partnership, association or corporation, including a usufructuary, who or 
which occupies a position of peculiar confidence toward any person, firm, 
association, partnership, trust or estate”). 
 31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:226(A). 
 32. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 355.  
 33. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 187.  
 34. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 397. 
 35. JACK B. SIEGEL, A DESKTOP GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS, 
OFFICERS, AND ADVISORS 80 (2006). 
 36. Id. 
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These examples of fiduciary duties translate into two main obligations: the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.37 
1. The Duty of Care 
The duty of care requires a director’s actions to be the same as that of 
a normal, prudent person acting in a like position.38 A director properly 
satisfies the duty of care by keeping informed of organizational activities, 
remaining attentive to the organization’s operations, and making decisions 
that are in the best interest of the organization.39 In the charitable context, 
directors must follow the duty of care when investing charitable assets and 
engaging in activities following the organization’s charitable mission.40 
Directors have a wide range of latitude in exercising control; however, 
they are still required to make informed decisions with proper judgment.41 
For example, a breach of the duty of care occurs when a director uses 
dedicated charitable funds against a donor’s wishes.42 
The business judgment rule shields directors from liability for 
violating the duty of care if the director has acted as an ordinarily prudent 
administrator would under like circumstances.43 Essentially, the business 
judgment rule is meant to protect directors from liability if they make 
informed business decisions.44 Courts apply the business judgment rule 
because judges do not view their role as second guessing director decisions 
and holding directors liable for well-intentioned decisions that turned out 
poorly.45 
A real-life example of a breach of the duty of care occurred when 
directors of the Allegheny Health Education and Research Foundation 
                                                                                                             
 37. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 355. A third duty, the duty of obedience, 
is often included, but the most commonly accepted duties are the duties of care 
and loyalty. Id. at 388. The duty of obedience captures the idea that a director is 
under an obligation to ensure that the corporation is acting within its stated 
purpose and mission. Id. The duty of obedience is a reflection of the age-old ultra 
vires doctrine that prohibits corporate acts that go beyond the corporation’s 
mission and purpose. Id. 
 38. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 
1400, 1420 (1998). 
 39. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 375.  
 40. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 433.  
 41. Id. 
 42. See Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 375–79. 
 43. Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, Revisiting the Duty of Care 
of the Nonprofit Director, 36 J. HEALTH L. 183, 189–90 (2003). 
 44. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 376–77. 
 45. Id. 
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(“AHERF”) used restricted funds to repay bank loans.46 AHERF liquidated 
money from endowment funds to pay back a bank loan of around $89 
million.47 The Pennsylvania Attorney General arrested three of the directors 
at AHERF and brought criminal charges for illegally spending money out 
of charitable endowment funds.48 This example sheds light on to just one 
example of directors who breach the duty of care and who attempt to hide 
behind the business judgment rule. 
2. The Duty of Loyalty 
The duty of loyalty requires board members to place personal interests 
behind those of the charity and its mission49 and sets standards for 
situations where a director has a conflict of interest.50 Under the duty of 
loyalty, directors are prohibited from completing self-dealing transactions 
that benefit themselves over the organization.51 A director can breach the 
duty of loyalty by disclosing confidential information, usurping a business 
opportunity from the charity, unlawfully distributing charitable assets, or 
using organizational funds for improper purposes.52 A common example 
of a director breaching the duty of loyalty is “a director who serves on the 
boards of two charities that are looking for major gifts from a specific 
donor or are interested in purchasing a specific parcel of real estate.”53 
Examples of directors breaching their duty of loyalty are more 
prevalent than breaches of the duty of care. Another real life example is 
Oral Suer, a former director at the United Way of the National Capital 
                                                                                                             
 46. Josh Goldstein & Karl Stark, Allegheny Chief Ordered Fund Switch the 
Health System Used Restricted Money to Repay an $89 Million Bank Loan, 
PHILLY.COM (Dec. 9, 1998), http://articles.philly.com/1998-12-09/news/25720088 
_1_allegheny-officials-allegheny-health-education-aherf [http://perma.cc/R8UJ-D 
W3C]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Pennsylvania Attorney General Fisher Announces Arrests of Three 
AHERF Officers; Trio Charged with Illegally Spending $52 Million in Charitable 
Funds, PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 15, 1998), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/pennsylvania-attorney-general-fisher-announces-arrests-of-three-aherf-of 
ficers-trio-charged-with-illegally-spending-52-million-in-charitable-funds-731058 
92.html [http://perma.cc/XA4N-4L3Y]. 
 49. Christyne J. Vachon, Blurring. Not Fading. Looking at the Duties of Care 
and Loyalty as Nonprofits Move into Commercialism, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. 
J. BUS. L. 37, 48 (2011). 
 50. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 381. 
 51. Id. at 381–82. 
 52. See Vachon, supra note 49, at 49. 
 53. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 436. 
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Area in Washington D.C.54 Suer defrauded the charity of roughly 
$500,000 for personal benefit.55 A federal court forced Suer to pay 
$497,000 in restitution and serve the maximum sentence of 27 months in 
prison.56 When directors breach these duties, the harmful impact extends 
beyond the charity and affects the public and the charity’s intended 
beneficiaries.  
II. OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT CHARITABLE 
ENFORCEMENT MODEL 
The oversight of charitable organizations is crucial because charities 
exist to provide a public benefit.57 Commenting on the state of charitable 
oversight, Professor Terri Lynn Helge has stated: “Substantial reform in 
the regulation of charitable organizations is necessary to curb the reported 
abuses that have undermined confidence in the charitable sector.”58 
Effective regulation of the charitable sector warrants proper oversight that 
assures the public that these organizations are following an accepted set of 
standards by which society has agreed these entities should abide.59 
A. The Need for Proper Oversight in the Charitable Sector 
A major reason why the government and the general public allow tax-
exempt organizations to exist is because the organizations serve their 
community in some way.60 When charities abuse their privileges, the public 
will lose faith in the entire sector.61 Wrongdoing in the charitable sector is 
due in part to the lack of standardization of good governance principals and 
improper or insufficient oversight from enforcement officials.62 
Scandals at large charitable organizations further demonstrate this 
problem and the need for charitable oversight reform. In the aftermath of 
the September 11 terrorist attacks, the American Red Cross used donations 
for purposes other than victim support, sparking controversy in the media 
                                                                                                             
 54. Jerry Markon, Ex-Chief of Local United Way Sentenced, WASH. POST (May 
15, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A27261-2004May14 
.html [http://perma.cc/5Z2W-Z9DE]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 255–56.  
 58. Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable 
Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 1 (2009). 
 59. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 489.  
 60. See Fishman, supra note 6, at 220.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 362.  
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and public.63 Another example is a board member at the Smithsonian 
Institute who resigned amid allegations of excessive salaries, enormous 
expense accounts, and personal trips funded by the museum in 2007.64  
Classifying scandals in the charitable sector as outliers is tempting.65 
Some truth to this idea may exist, as the precise extent of wrongdoing in 
the charitable sector is difficult to determine.66 These examples are not 
alone, as there are many more cases of indecency both reported and 
unreported.67 Scandals such as these illustrate the fact that the problem 
extends beyond isolated incidents and the need for reform across the 
charitable spectrum. 
B. Director and Organization Accountability in Different Business 
Sectors 
In comparison to the charitable sector, the for-profit sector has more 
means of accountability and greater oversight of organizations and 
directors.68 During the past decade, the federal government has reformed 
for-profit corporate governance and heightened the accountability 
standards of corporate directors.69  
The traditional corporate accountability model relies on oversight 
from the company’s shareholders.70 Shareholders have standing to bring 
suit against directors and officers of the corporation for violations of 
                                                                                                             
 63. See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward 
Decay, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 20–21 (2011) (stating that “the fallout was 
considerable, and contributed to an erosion of confidence in charities, later 
reinforced by continuing press reports of scandals in the sector”). 
 64. Jacqueline Trescott & James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian’s Small Quits in 
Wake of Inquiry, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2007, at A1.  
 65. See Colinvaux, supra note 63, at 19.  
 66. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 13–14. The author cites a study 
of nonprofit corruption between 1995 and 2002 that showed 152 instances of 
nonprofit directors accused of either criminal or civil wrongdoing. Id. Yet, at the 
same time there were an estimated 1.4 million nonprofit organizations operating 
in the United States. Id. This data most likely suggests serious underreporting and 
a lack of oversight in the sector as a whole. Id. 
 67. See Charity Watch Hall of Shame, CHARITY WATCH, https://www 
.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/charitywatch-hall-of-shame/63 [https://perma 
.cc/GZ7D-9J2F] (last visited Sept. 21, 2015) (chronicling charity directors involved in 
major charity scandals throughout the 21st century).  
 68. See generally Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 358–60 (describing the 
increased reforms that have taken place in corporate governance). 
 69. Id. at 357.  
 70. ELIZABETH SARAH GERE, PAUL C. VITRANO & STEPHANIE T. SCHMELZ, 
BE PREPARED: NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS’ LEGAL RISKS AND PROTECTIONS 10 
(2005), available at http://www.altru.com/resources/Altru_LiabilityExposure 
Update.pdf [http://perma.cc/79CD-GWBS]. 
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fiduciary obligations.71 These suits, called derivative actions, can be an 
effective tool to hold directors accountable in situations of director self-
dealing and other instances of breaches of the duty of loyalty.72  
The Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) also plays a role in governing for-profit corporations. 
The SEC seeks to monitor “[c]ompanies offering securities for sale to the 
public[,] . . . the securities they are selling, and the risks involved in investing 
in those securities.”73 The primary function of SEC oversight is to 
“regulat[e] brokers, investment advisors, mutual funds, and market 
operators.”74 The enforcement staff, composed of roughly 250 attorneys and 
other professionals, conduct informal and formal inquiries into possible 
securities violations and if violations are discovered, the attorneys impose 
sanctions on the transgressor.75 Federal securities law allows the SEC to 
institute injunctive proceedings, civil penalties or fines, cease-and-desist 
orders, or proceedings directly against securities professionals.76 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,77 which Congress passed in hopes 
of building public confidence in corporations and to provide better 
oversight of these organizations, is another tool for overseeing for-profit 
corporations.78 The Act initiated various governance reforms in the 
corporate sphere.79 Congress limited the Act to for-profit corporations, 
however, and it is not applicable to charitable organizations.80  
Another model used to protect the public from for-profit director duty 
breaches is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).81 
FINRA is a government-authorized nonprofit organization dedicated to 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. 
 72. Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability 
Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 214 (2010).  
 73. U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, The Role of the SEC, INVESTOR.GOV, 
http://investor.gov/introduction-markets/role-sec#.VFFhH_nF98E [http://perma.cc 
/42ZB-LVNE] (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
 74. Peter J. Henning, Should the SEC Spin Off the Enforcement Division?, 11 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 121, 123 (2009). 
 75. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings: 
Strategic Considerations for When the Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1143, 1145 (1999). 
 76. Id. at 1173.  
 77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 78. Eric M. Fogel, David I. Addis & Edward C. Harris, Public Company 
Shareholders Acting as Owners: Three Reforms—Introducing the “Oversight 
Shareholder”, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 519 (2004). 
 79. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 358.  
 80. Id. 
 81. About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ [http://perma.cc 
/TKN9-7DT7] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
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ensuring that the securities industry operates correctly and honestly.82 
FINRA regulates all securities firms who conduct business with the public, 
overseeing approximately 633,000 registered security representatives.83 
FINRA enforces federal securities laws, its own set of standards, and rules 
that the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has put in place.84 FINRA 
is also authorized to discipline securities dealers who violate regulations 
by leveling fines and barring brokers from the securities industry.85 
Overall, there is much more oversight of for-profit, public 
organizations than charitable organizations because the public is more 
financially invested in for-profit organizations, and misdoings in the for-
profit sector have a broad range of consequences for the public.86 While 
the government has taken a proactive role in regulating for-profit 
corporations, changes to the charitable regulation scheme have been slow 
to develop.  
C. Charitable Enforcement through the State Attorney General 
In most states, the attorney general supervises the charitable sector by 
monitoring funds donated to public charities and preventing these charities 
from misappropriating donated funds.87 The attorney general acts as the 
representative of charity beneficiaries and donors of charitable 
organizations in this way.88 State attorneys general have the exclusive 
                                                                                                             
 82. Id. 
 83. Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory 
Organization’s Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
963, 968–69 (2012). 
 84. What We Do, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/WhatWeDo/ 
[http://perma.cc/FMJ4-YB24] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Reforms of for-profit corporate governance took place in part because of 
corporate fraud during the Enron era and the financial collapse of 2008. Hazen & 
Hazen, supra note 1, at 358. These events caused public and governmental 
concern over corporate governance policies and the duties of corporate directors. 
Id. The majority of the reforms mentioned above, however, were limited to 
publicly traded, for-profit corporations. Id.  
 87. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 305–06. The state attorney general is 
an external enforcer of charitable organizations, but scholars have suggested a 
number of internal actions charitable organizations should take to avoid liability. 
SIEGEL, supra note 35, at 491–600. These internal controls provide oversight to 
help directors and managers avoid operational liabilities. Internal controls are a 
first defense against director and organizational misconduct. A complete 
discussion of these controls is outside the scope of this Comment. For an overview 
of a charity’s internal controls, see id. 
 88. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 443. 
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authority to enforce fiduciary obligations in most states and proper 
oversight of the charitable sector falls firmly on their shoulders.89  
State attorneys general’s offices require charities to register with their 
office, file annual informational reports, and provide copies of federal 
informational returns and audited financial statements.90 Attorneys general 
can then file suit against these organizations to correct violations of 
charitable law,91 and have the power to remove directors, dissolve violating 
organizations, or request an accounting of charitable assets.92 In most states, 
the attorney general is also responsible for charitable solicitation “to protect 
. . . donors from deceptive and fraudulent solicitation practices or diversion 
or waste of donated funds.”93 However, one drawback is the fact that 
attorneys general do not have the power to monitor charities in their day-to-
day operations.94 
D. Regulation of Charities through the IRS 
The IRS is responsible for enforcing federal tax law on charitable 
organizations.95 In 2004, amidst ongoing scandals in the charitable sector,96 
Mark W. Everson, the then-commissioner of the IRS, testified in front of the 
U.S. Senate Finance Committee about the IRS’s plans to implement more 
thorough oversight of the sector.97 Commissioner Everson spoke about the 
problems in the sector including ethical violations, the lack of internal 
oversight measures, and conflicts of interest among directors.98 In light of 
these problems, Commissioner Everson proposed a plan to increase 
oversight of charitable organizations that included imposing penalties on 
violating organizations and increased review of the Form 990.99 The Form 
990 is an annual reporting form that all charitable organizations must file 
with the IRS,100 mirroring an audited financial statement.101 Commissioner 
Everson stated that the IRS was going to switch from a passive to active role 
                                                                                                             
 89. Helge, supra note 58, at 13. 
 90. Id. at 14. Charitable organizations may be required to have an audited 
financial statement prepared by a certified public accountant. Donnelly, supra 
note 16, at 170. 
 91. Fishman, supra note 6, at 260. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 261–62. 
 94. Id. at 262. 
 95. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 498. 
 96. See supra Part II.B. 
 97. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 179.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 165. 
 101. Fishman, supra note 6, at 241. 
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to prevent charitable organization scandals from unfolding, stating that 
continued abuse “would no longer be tolerated.”102 
The Form 990 was recently revised with a new version released for 
filings beginning in 2009.103 The new form poses questions designed to 
elicit the policies and practices in place of the filing charity’s governance 
structure.104 The revised form also aims to increase transparency of 
director compensation and involvement.105 The filing of the Form 990 
must include “the process by which the officers, directors, trustees, or 
management reviewed the form, whether the form was reviewed before it 
was filed with the IRS, who conducted the review, when it was conducted, 
and the extent of the review.”106 A new section titled “Governance, 
Management, and Disclosure” requires detailed answers about the 
charity’s governing board and management practices.107  
Noncompliance with the items in the new Form 990 “will, at a 
minimum, raise a red flag and could trigger an investigation or an audit 
risk.”108 The ultimate penalty that an organization can receive for violating 
IRS regulations is the loss of tax-exempt status.109 No federal law grants 
the IRS the power to regulate charitable governance, however; charities 
have the right to reject IRS recommendations.110 The Form 990 disclosures 
do not specifically require that charities follow a set of good governance 
standards; however, they are “designed to strongly encourage 
transparency and accountability.”111 Additionally, as one commentator 
noted, “the questions asked on the new form will not necessarily reflect 
the effectiveness or the efficiency with which a board of any size 
operates.”112 
                                                                                                             
 102. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 179–180. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 181. 
 105. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 367–68 (“The Form 990 must also 
indicate whether the process for determining the compensation for the CEO, key 
officers and key employees included a review and approval by independent 
persons, consideration of compensation data for comparable positions at similar 
organizations, and contemporaneous documentation of deliberations and 
decisions regarding compensation.”). 
 106. Id. at 367. 
 107. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 183.  
 108. Id. at 188. 
 109. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 368. 
 110. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 188. 
 111. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 397. 
 112. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 184.  
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E. Watchdog Oversight of the Charitable Sector 
Independent watchdog organizations also monitor and provide oversight 
of the charitable sector.113 Watchdog organizations use a system of 
evaluations and ratings based on charities’ public 990 filings.114 Watchdog 
focus groups typically use a rating system to evaluate how a particular charity 
uses donor funds.115 Watchdog organizations can give lower grades based on 
a charity’s reporting, which may “cause donors to look past that particular 
charity in favor of other, higher-ranking organizations.”116 
These organizations serve an important part in enforcing fiduciary 
standards, but they are no substitute for official enforcement procedures that 
hold charities accountable.117 Charities have no obligation to report to these 
organizations and their oversight is limited to informal investigations and 
whatever information can be discerned from a charity’s Form 990. 
F. Charitable Enforcement in Louisiana 
In Louisiana, the Office of the Attorney General is responsible for 
monitoring and assisting charitable organizations operating in the state, 
although there is no express statutory authority granting this responsibility.118 
The only writing that delegates or references the Attorney General’s duty to 
oversee charitable organizations is found on their official website, which 
states that it will “assist [donors] with how to make a wise charitable 
donation and . . . assist charitable organizations . . . with their legal 
obligations”119 
Title 51 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes holds the Trade and 
Commerce protection statutes in Louisiana.120 Chapter 24, the Deceptive 
Practices in Soliciting Charitable Contributions section, gives the Louisiana 
Attorney General the power to prosecute charitable organizations that 
“engage in unfair methods of competition, unfair or deceptive practices, or 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 167. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Helge, supra note 58, at 61–62; see also Criteria & Methodology, 
CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-criteria-method 
ology [perma.cc/6GZH-GTDF] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015) (providing an 
overview of how Charity Watch, a charitable watchdog organization, rates and 
grades charities based on different criteria and factors). 
 116. Donnelly, supra note 16, at 191. 
 117. See Fleishman, supra note 27, at 185.  
 118. Charities, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. STATE LA., https://www.ag.state.la.us/Article 
.aspx?articleID=3&catID=0 [https://perma.cc/P3DM-A9N6] (last visited Sept. 2, 
2015). 
 119. Id. 
 120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51 (2012). 
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misrepresentation.”121 The Consumer Protection Section (“CPS”) of the 
attorney general’s office issues Civil Investigative Demands (“CIDs”) 
against charities suspected of engaging in prohibited practices.122 Based on 
information obtained through a CID, the CPS will decide whether to take 
disciplinary actions against the alleged wrongdoer. Though the attorney 
general may file suit, the majority of proceedings filed against charitable 
organizations are settled before charges are even filed.123 
G. Limitations and Restrictions on the State Attorney General’s 
Oversight in the Charitable Sector 
State attorneys general face severe limitations that prevent them from 
proper oversight of the charitable sector.124 Enforcement through the 
attorney general’s office is limited, particularly in correcting violations of 
duties of care and loyalty and ensuring that charitable funds are properly 
allocated.125  
Many attorney general offices face staffing problems and inadequate 
funding, which complicates enforcement efforts.126 A survey conducted in 
2007 revealed that 74% of states had only one or fewer full-time attorneys 
dedicated to charitable oversight, even as the number of charitable 
organizations has more than doubled in the past 15 years.127 This lack of 
                                                                                                             
 121. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1905(A) (2012). The entire section states: 
It shall be unlawful for any charitable organization, solicitor therefor, or 
person owning, managing, directing, representing, or acting as agent for any 
charitable organization, an organization soliciting contributions for any 
charitable organization, or an organization claiming to sell merchandise, 
products, goods, or services for charitable purposes to engage in unfair 
methods of competition, unfair or deceptive practices, or misrepresentation.  
Id. 
 122. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1411 (Supp. 2015). A CID is a written request for 
information from an attorney general’s office. Peter A. Nolan, Yes, You Do Need to 
Respond to Civil Investigative Demands, METRO. CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 1, 2007), 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/8820/yes-you-do-need-respond-civil-in 
vestigative-demands [http://perma.cc/PC59-XYTD]. The purpose of a CID is to 
collect information in a similar fashion to the pre-trial discovery phase. Id. The state 
attorney general uses CIDs to gather information pursuant to an investigation of 
alleged wrongdoing. Id.  
 123. See generally FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 446 (stating that 
attorneys general have increasingly used the threat of litigation to make charities 
agree to settlements). 
 124. Hazen & Hazen, supra note 1, at 402–03.  
 125. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 443. 
 126. Id. at 445. 
 127. Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of 
Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (2007); Number of Nonprofit 
Organizations in the United States, 1999–2009, NCCS, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org 
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staffing and resources also contributes to a lack of information flowing 
from oversight officials to legislatures considering new laws.128 Attorney 
general offices are also self-sustaining through administrative fees, 
legislative appropriations, and fines and settlement awards collected from 
violating organizations. 129 Louisiana’s registration fee is relatively low at 
$25 per year, as compared to other states’ registration scaled fee systems 
based on the charity’s size and contributions made to the organization.130 
California, for instance, has a scaling registration fee between $25 and 
$300, depending on the organization’s revenue.131  
Another major impediment to attorney general oversight is the 
politicization of attorney general offices.132 Because attorneys general are 
elected officials, scholars have criticized their enforcement efforts for 
being politically biased.133 For example, state attorneys general have 
occasionally attempted to block the relocation of charities to keep 
donations within their state.134 State attorneys general may be reluctant “to 
move in an aggressive and timely fashion when to do so might be 
politically difficult—despite abundant grounds for concern about damage 
to the public interest.”135  
Centralization and standardization is another obstacle in holding 
charities accountable. This problem is partially due to the excessive 
                                                                                                             
/PubApps/profile1.php?state=US [http://perma.cc/U7HA-WAPA] (last visited Sept. 
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 128. Jenkins, supra note 127, at 1129–30. 
 129. Fishman, supra note 6, at 263.  
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FK9-ZKJW] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). 
 131. See Office of the Att’y Gen., New Charity Registration Requirements and 
Fees, STATE CAL. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://oag.ca.gov/charities/content/reg_req [http: 
//perma.cc/8LR5-NBS4] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015); N.J. Div. of Consumer Affairs, 
Charities Registration Section, STATE N.J., http://www.njconsumeraffairs 
.gov/charities/Pages/registration.aspx [http://perma.cc/DP47-HPV5] (last updated 
Apr. 9, 2015, 8:48 AM) (having fees ranging from $60 to $250, depending on gross 
contributions); Or. Dep’t of Justice, Form CT-12F (2014), available at 
http://www.doj.state.or.us/charigroup/pdf/2014_web_ct-12f.pdf [http://perma.cc 
/A9PH-459K] (fees ranging from $10 to $200 dependent on annual revenue); N.Y. 
Office of the Att’y Gen., Form CHAR500 (2014), available at http://www 
.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/CHAR500_2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/69NT-AZ9A] 
(annual registration fees ranging from $0 to $1500 dependent on the organization’s 
net worth). 
 132. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 21, at 446. 
 133. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 494 (suggesting that an attorney 
general’s motivation for enforcing fiduciary standards could be political rather 
than effective enforcement concerns). 
 134. Id. at 548. 
 135. Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
613, 617 (2005). 
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number of regulators who all have different methods and levels of 
enforcement.136 Scholars have noted “the increasing overlap in enforcement 
jurisdictions of the state attorneys general and the IRS” have resulted in 
“inefficiencies in the regulation of the [charitable] sector.”137 The result has 
been a “pass-the-ball” game in which both entities believe the other one will 
handle regulation, which results in no enforcement at all.138  
Another challenge facing Louisiana’s attorney general oversight is the 
fact that only charities using professional solicitors are required to register 
with the office.139 The Louisiana Attorney General does not keep records of 
charities operating in the state that do not use professional solicitors.140 State 
attorneys general cannot properly regulate charities if they records of their 
operation do not exist.141  
H. Standing to Sue in the Charitable Arena 
In addition to the lack of proper oversight, standing challenges often 
complicate suits to enforce director fiduciary obligations.142 In for-profit 
corporations, shareholders have standing to bring suit against directors and 
officers for violating their fiduciary obligations.143 Charitable organizations, 
on the other hand, do not have shareholders; thus, only a limited number of 
persons have standing to bring suits directly against directors for violations.144 
Courts have found that only fellow officers and directors, state attorneys 
general, and individuals with special relationships to the charity have standing 
to sue.145 Complicating the standing issue is the fact that many courts have set 
high standing requirements for persons to sue in the charitable sector.146  
In Louisiana, however, no restrictions prevent a charitable corporation 
from having shareholders; the restrictions only prohibit corporations from 
distributing profits or earnings to these shareholders.147 Yet no decisions 
                                                                                                             
 136. See generally Helge, supra note 58, at 79–80 (stating the inefficiencies 
resulting from multiple regulatory enforcement powers). 
 137. Id. at 79.  
 138. Id. at 80.  
 139. Charities, supra note 118. A professional solicitor is “any person who, for 
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have been reported in Louisiana of a shareholder bringing a derivative suit 
against a charity’s directors, and courts have not declared whether the 
shareholder would have standing in this situation. As demonstrated, there 
are a plethora of challenges facing regulation of the charitable sector. 
There are many scholars that recognize that a change is needed, but the 
debate is ongoing as to which solution is the best to effectuate that change. 
III. SCHOLARLY PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT TO OVERSIGHT 
Commentators have long criticized attorneys general as ill equipped 
to properly monitor charitable organizations.148 Often, rumors will 
circulate of alleged wrongdoing without a formal investigation from the 
attorney general office.149 Scholars have criticized this enforcement model 
for over 50 years and have proposed a variety of new models that better 
ensure oversight of the charitable sector.150 
A. New State Agency 
Professor Kenneth L. Karst gave one of the first proposals for change 
in charitable oversight in the 1960s.151 He suggested a new state agency 
responsible “for supervising private charities and for administering the 
various state controls over their operations.”152 Under this proposal, each 
state would have its own independent agency responsible for charitable 
oversight and enforcing fiduciary obligations of directors.153 The agency 
would collect periodic reports from charitable organizations to provide 
transparency of organizations operating in its state.154 Professor Karst 
believed that a new agency was advantageous as compared to the current 
model because it would create a unified central administration system of 
the charitable sector and also include experts, such as accountants, 
specifically trained to audit and investigate charities.155 Professor Karst 
thought that directors and managers of charitable organizations would also 
                                                                                                             
 148. Fleishman, supra note 27, at 185–86. 
 149. Id. at 187. 
 150. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An 
Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433 (1960) (proposing a new 
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benefit from this system because the system would standardize reporting 
and oversight under one state agency.156 He also believed that a unified 
agency would have the capacity to provide assessments of the charitable 
landscape to make proposals to the state’s legislature for new regulations.157 
Issues with forming a new state agency to regulate the charitable sector 
do exist, however. One issue is state hesitation of withdrawing charitable 
oversight from state attorneys general and handing such a task over to a new, 
inexperienced agency.158 Further, state budgetary constraints would likely 
make this option almost impossible to implement.159 Many states struggle 
with budgetary constraints and the public may see a new agency as an 
improper use of state funds when there is already an oversight system in 
place.160 Another issue is coordinating the new state agency with other states 
and the federal regulatory agencies responsible for charitable oversight.161 
B. State Charity Commission Working in Conjunction with the State 
Attorney General 
In 2003, Professor James Fishman proposed a state charity commission 
to regulate a state’s charitable sector that would work in conjunction with 
the state’s attorney general.162 Under this model, an assistant from the 
attorney general’s office would manage a delegation of 15 people—7 
appointed by the state attorney general and 8 appointed by the governor—
responsible for oversight of the state’s charitable organizations.163 The 
commission would have exclusive authority over the charitable sector, 
including the power to investigate complaints made against organizations.164 
Under the new model, when a complaint is filed against a charity, a panel 
consisting of three randomly selected commissioners would investigate the 
complaint and, if validated, serve a copy of the complaint on the charity.165 
The panel would have the authority to settle or resolve the issue or, if 
                                                                                                             
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 518–19 (finding that a new state 
agency could result in governmental waste because the state attorneys general’s 
offices already have experience in the area in every state). 
 159. For an understanding of state budgetary constraints, see Janet Loehrke et 
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 160. See id. 
 161. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 541–45. 
 162. Fishman, supra note 6, at 272. 
 163. Id. at 272–73. 
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necessary, bring the matter in front of the entire commission for review.166 
Professor Fishman argued that this system would strengthen oversight of 
the sector because the commission would be a remedial body capable of 
correcting fiduciary behavior.167 He also believed that the new system 
would keep citizens interested in charitable oversight.168 
The aforementioned problems with oversight by the attorney general, 
such as politicization, would likely also be present in a commission having 
strong ties to the office, however.169 Another issue would arise if some 
states adopted the proposal and others did not.170 Budgetary constraints 
could also affect this model because no reason exists to believe that a new 
state commission would receive any more funding than the attorney 
general’s office.171 
C. Federal Regulatory Commission 
In 1999, Professor Joel Fleishman proposed a federal regulatory agency, 
called the U.S. Charities Regulatory Commission, which would be 
responsible for regulating and overseeing charitable organizations.172 Under 
this model, the President would appoint commissioners responsible for 
regulating all nonprofit organizations.173 Professor Fleishman believed the 
commission could model the Federal Trade Commission or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.174 The commission would handle investigations of 
alleged fiduciary breaches and also have the power to commence civil or 
criminal proceedings when violations were discovered.175 Further, the new 
commission would “be empowered to investigate instances of wrongdoing, 
subpoena witnesses, and institute civil or criminal proceedings on its own 
motion.”176 The IRS would remain in charge of all tax-related issues, but work 
in conjunction with the commission to regulate the sector.177 This approach 
would allow the IRS to focus on enforcing federal tax law and leave the new 
commission to monitor wrongdoing in the charitable sector.178 Professor 
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Fleishman also suggested that that the commission should defer to state 
enforcement procedures to promote comity and a working relationship 
between the new commission and state enforcement officials.179  
Even Professor Fleishman acknowledged, however, that mass 
reorganization and drastic changes to regulation of the nonprofit sector should 
not be the first solution.180 He believed it should be a last resort, as charitable 
organizations would face significant changes and transition costs.181 Another 
issue facing a new federal commission is the fact that Congress cannot compel 
a state to adopt a federally enforced set of fiduciary standards.182 Professor 
Fleishman also worried about the commission’s effectiveness in the face of 
political partisanship or a lack of funding.183 
D. Exclusive Regulation by the IRS 
Several scholars and government officials have suggested that the IRS 
would be the perfect organization to regulate the entire charitable sector.184 
Specifically, former Congresswoman Bonnie S. Brier suggested that the 
IRS could develop a list of recommended good governance standards that 
charitable organizations should adopt.185 Congresswoman Brier believed 
that organizations would automatically adopt these standards to retain tax-
exempt status.186 Additionally, Congress could empower the IRS to 
condition tax-exemption status on an organization following fiduciary 
                                                                                                             
 179. Fleishman, supra note 27, at 190–91. 
 180. Id. at 186–87. Fleishman actually proposed three options and stated of the 
federal agency: “The third strategy—a new federal agency—is a strategy of last 
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standards.187 Further, scholars have suggested giving the IRS the power to 
remove fiduciaries they find unfit to serve as leaders of charitable 
organizations.188 In this sense, the IRS could possibly work with Congress 
to provide a single set of federal standards that all nonprofits across the 
United States would have to follow.189 
Uncertainty persists, however, in allowing the IRS to take on this 
additional responsibility. The IRS lacks, and has only slowly developed, 
experience in charitable governance.190 Further, the IRS may not be 
proficient in deciding whether a set of governance standards will actually 
“improve compliance with fiduciary duties by charity leaders.”191 Another 
concern is how coordination would take place between the IRS and state 
oversight.192 The recent scandals uncovered at the IRS may also bring 
hesitation from Congress and the American people to hand over more 
power to the IRS.193 
E. Expanding Standing in Charitable Director Suits  
In 1999, Professor Geoffrey Manne argued that expanding standing to 
private actors could help regulate the sector more effectively than 
government regulation.194 Professor Manne argued for creating private, for-
profit organizations that would monitor charities and bring suits against 
violators, with the expectation that these monitoring organizations would 
successfully curb charitable and director actions to meet fiduciary 
obligations.195 New legislation would require all charitable organizations to 
contract with one of these organizations to monitor their charitable 
operations.196 The contract would give the monitoring organization the right 
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general] decision says it had not?”). 
 193. See generally IRS Tea Party Scandal, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huf 
fingtonpost.com/news/irs-tea-party-scandal/ [http://perma.cc/CCT5-97WL] (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2015) (containing articles related to the IRS Tea Party scandal). 
 194. Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable 
Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227, 253. 
 195. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 502.  
 196. Id. 
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to sue the charity for violating its charitable mission or in situations where 
directors have breached their fiduciary obligations.197 Professor Manne 
argued that this model would improve accountability within the sector 
without subjecting charitable organizations to frivolous public lawsuits, 
while also reducing government oversight costs.198 
Concern over the financial incentives and enforcement motivations of 
the new oversight organizations would likely arise. Many charitable 
organizations could simply choose to refrain from entering a relationship 
with a monitoring company because of budget constraints.199 The 
monitoring companies may avoid proper oversight to retain more charities 
as clients.200 Without proper oversight of the newly created monitoring 
companies, the risk of collusion between the monitoring company and a 
charity could be unchecked.201  
F. Self-Regulatory Organization 
Marcus Owens, a former director of the IRS’s Exempt Organizations 
Division, proposed a unique model of charitable oversight where a self-
regulatory organization would be responsible for charitable corporate 
governance oversight.202 The “organization would have the authority to 
promulgate rules applicable to charitable organizations[,] . . . process 
applications for exemptions, and conduct oversight of the charitable sector 
through examinations.”203 Owens’ proposal would be modeled after the SEC 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”).204 He believed 
that Congress could charter the tax-exempt oversight organization with 
funding coming from the excise tax levied against charitable organizations.205 
As a condition for receiving tax-exempt status from the IRS, the organization 
would be required to register under the new oversight board for monitoring.206 
                                                                                                             
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Helge, supra note 58, at 52. 
 200. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 529 (suggesting that “contract 
[companies] would try to maximize current profits by going easy on their charity 
clients, especially if by doing so they could increase their revenues either by 
attracting more clients or providing other fee-based services”). 
 201. Helge, supra note 58, at 51. 
 202. Id. at 69.  
 203. Id. 
 204. Mayer & Wilson, supra note 25, at 503. NASD is now called the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Id. 
 205. Marcus S. Owens, Charity Oversight: An Alternative Approach 11–12 
(Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 33.4, 2006). 
 206. Helge, supra note 58, at 71.  
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There are several theories as to how the charitable sector should be 
overseen, but there is one general consensus—it must be reformed. Although 
no solution may be perfect, some reformation is better than the current model. 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A STATE SELF-REGULATORY NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATION 
Though scholars have proposed a variety of solutions to the problem of 
charitable oversight, all of the solutions have flaws. This Comment proposes a 
self-funded state regulatory organization, called the Louisiana Charitable 
Regulatory Organization (“LCRO”), responsible for regulating charitable 
organizations. The LCRO’s self-funded model would place minimal reliance 
on the state government and avoid funding deficits, government interference, 
politicization, and a lack of accountability within the sector. 
A. The LCRO’s Structure, Responsibilities, and Model for Enforcement 
A proper structure to the LCRO is critical to its functioning. A state 
legislative committee would charter the LCRO and appoint members to its 
executive body.207 Members of this executive board could potentially include 
donors and beneficiaries of the charitable sector, former staff of the attorney 
general’s office, and current or former directors from charities.208 This 
executive governing body would be responsible for conducting investigations, 
handing out penalties against violating organizations, and reporting to the state 
committee. LCRO employees would handle investigative procedures and 
bring charges against violating organizations to the LCRO board. 
The LCRO would regulate all charitable formation and organization. Any 
organization seeking to form as a charity, and specifically as a charitable 
organization, within the state would first apply to the LCRO for approval 
before commencing operations in the state. The LCRO would have exclusive 
control to grant approval to applicants and also control organizations’ tax-
exempt status within the state.209  
                                                                                                             
 207. See id. at 70 (describing how a similar federal oversight body would be 
structured and operate). 
 208. Id. at 71. 
 209. Existing organizations could be grandfathered in and would not have to seek 
approval to form once the LCRO began operating. This process would most likely 
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charitable organizations receiving tax-exempt status from the IRS automatically 
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Primarily, the LCRO would be responsible for oversight of charities 
operating in Louisiana. The LCRO would promote and distribute uniform 
rules and regulations that charities must follow, apprising charitable 
organizations of exactly what standards they must follow. 210 The greatest 
benefit of the LCRO is the unified system of oversight and standardized 
accountability in a central enforcement body.  
To ensure transparency and garner the public’s trust in this new model, 
the LCRO would make the results of investigations publicly available.211 
In addition, an independent auditor would review the LCRO’s operations 
and finances and provide a copy of this report to the state committee and the 
public.212 An additional check on the LCRO’s operations could include a 
charity’s ability to appeal decisions through the regular judicial process.213 
B. The Necessity of a Self-Funded Model 
A self-funded model would allow the LCRO the flexibility needed to 
adapt and meet the needs of the charities it governs.214 To achieve self-
sustaining status, the LCRO would charge a mandatory annual fee to all 
charitable organizations operating in the state, rather than only the ones 
using charitable solicitors.215 To avoid drastic burdens and overcharges on 
smaller organizations, the LCRO would enforce the mandatory fee on a 
sliding scale, dependent on the charity’s annual donations.216 These 
proceeds would be used to run the LCRO’s day-to-day operations of 
charitable oversight. Other fee assessments could include an application fee, 
fines, and settlement awards against charities that violate LCRO regulations. 
                                                                                                             
[http://perma.cc/45K6-GTU9] (last visited Sept. 2, 2015). LCRO would usurp this 
power from the Louisiana Department of Revenue, and develop its own criteria for 
determining state tax-exempt status within Louisiana.  
 210. For an example of what this might look like, see EDMUND G. BROWN JR., 
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES (2005) available at 
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.
pdf [http://perma.cc/6DCD-8K5N]. 
 211. Helge, supra note 58, at 75. 
 212. Id. at 71. 
 213. Id. at 75. A charity’s decision to remove an individual director would also 
be appealable directly by the individual.  
 214. To get started, the LCRO may require government funding to begin 
operations; however, the goal would be to wean off government involvement over 
a set period of years. 
 215. See supra Part II.G. 
 216. See supra note 131.  
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C. The Benefits of a New System of Oversight 
Although some problems, including the lack of funding for 
enforcement, could be solved without removing authority from the 
attorney general, a new state regulatory organization would more squarely 
address all of the constraints that currently hinder the office.217 A primary 
benefit of the LCRO is having an oversight body focused solely on the 
regulation of the charitable sector. Also, the LCRO would overcome the 
financial constraints that currently impede effective charitable oversight 
from the attorney general’s office. Annual fees from charities would help 
ensure that the LCRO has the flexibility needed to adjust and correct the 
enforcement needs of the charitable sector.218  
The LCRO would also avoid political and governmental constraints 
that hinder present enforcement. A current system that the LCRO could 
aim to mimic is FINRA.219 The LCRO could additionally remove political 
influences by including broad representation on the executive board, thus 
protecting against governmental and political influence.220 Transparency, 
independent audits, and oversight from the state committee would ensure 
that the executive board is using effective enforcement measures free from 
political agendas.221 Although the possibility of making changes to the 
current oversight system exists, restructuring and restarting with the 
LCRO would allow an oversight model to be fashioned in a way to address 
the issues with the current system.  
D. LCRO Problems to Consider 
A significant obstacle to creating a new state-level regulatory 
organization is a lack of political will.222 Very few state legislatures have 
                                                                                                             
 217. Helge, supra note 58, at 79.  
 218. Id. 
 219. See supra Part II.C. Other private organizations that regulate 
professionals, such as the American Bar Association and the American Medical 
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passed legislation requiring depth in charitable oversight, and “whether 
any state legislature[] [has] provided the state attorney general’s office 
with adequate funding or staffing to effectively regulate charities” is 
dubious.223 Louisiana’s legislature would have to take a more proactive 
approach in charitable oversight and realize the problems current oversight 
measures present. But scholarly criticism and the influence from states that 
have developed better enforcement procedures have begun to push charitable 
reform to a national level, which may help overcome this obstacle.224 
Another potential concern is coordination between a new regulatory 
organization and other state and federal oversight agencies.225 The LCRO will 
also have to coordinate with the IRS.226 A strong developmental and planning 
phase prior to implementation will ease the transition to LCRO oversight. This 
type of planning stage will help ensure that all organizations are on the same 
page when the LCRO begins to operate. There is no one correct way to offset 
the coordination concern; it will be important to take note of the issue in the 
transition phase.  
A bigger concern is the coordination between the LCRO and 
regulatory programs of other states. This problem is probably not entirely 
solvable but can be mitigated through various measures. First, the LCRO 
would need to have absolute clarity in its regulations to ensure that 
charities operating in multiple states know exactly what is expected of 
them in Louisiana.227 Secondly, the LCRO’s model would not be entirely 
different from the current regulatory system in place, allowing charities to 
easily operate in Louisiana and other states. Although the state-to-state 
enforcement problem is a concern, it can be mitigated with a detailed 
transition and planning phase that directly communicates to charities 
operating in Louisiana what to expect before the LCRO officially begins 
operations. 
The state legislative committee tasked with chartering the LCRO 
could appoint members or former members of the attorney general’s office 
to the LCRO’s executive board to smooth the transition of oversight to the 
organization. The attorney general’s office may be hesitant to give up its 
power to regulate charitable organizations, so this type of appointment 
could help ease the transition. Although the public could see switching to 
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a new system as a waste of resources,228 the positive effects that the LCRO 
would have on charitable oversight would outweigh the problems created 
by Louisiana’s transition to the organization.  
CONCLUSION 
A new enforcement model is necessary to properly monitor charitable 
organizations in Louisiana. Current restrictions on oversight through the 
attorney general’s office and a lack of proper enforcement measures have 
made efficient regulation of the charitable sector practically nonexistent. 
The charitable sector must maintain the public’s confidence, making 
reform necessary. Although no solution may be the perfect solution, the 
current oversight problems provide an opportunity for Louisiana to adopt 
a new enforcement model. A self-funded state regulatory organization, 
such as the LCRO, will address the financial, political, and organizational 
constraints that hinder oversight through the attorney general’s office. The 
new system will allow Louisiana to set a precedent for charity reform 
across the country and finally address a problem scholars have criticized 
for over 50 years. 
 
Maxwell B. Kallenberger 
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new enforcement organization). 
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